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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Fei Yan Zhu, a native and citizen of the People’s 
Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion 
to reopen her removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2.  Because the BIA’s opinion did not reflect 
meaningful consideration of much of the evidence that Zhu 
submitted in support of her motion, we will grant the petition 
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for review, vacate the order denying the motion to reopen, 
and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.1   
 
I.  
  
 Zhu is from Changmen Village, Guantou Town, 
Lianjiang County, Fujian Province, China.  She entered the 
United States in 1999 without proper documentation.   During 
her interview with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”), she stated that she feared persecution 
because of her opposition to China’s population control 
policies.  The INS determined that she met the credible fear 
standard, and she was paroled into the United States for a 
hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) to determine her 
eligibility for asylum.  
 
 On February 15, 2000, Zhu appeared before the IJ, 
conceded her removability, and filed an application for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), based on a claim that 
she had been and/or would be persecuted for having resisted 
population control measures.  At the hearing, Zhu testified 
that she had a heated exchange with birth control officials and 
that they tried to force her to wear an intrauterine device 
                                              
 1 We note at the outset that the record in the instant 
case is very similar to that considered by the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 
2013), and the BIA appears to have used almost identical 
language in its decisions in both cases.  The Seventh Circuit 
found “the BIA failed meaningfully to address documents 
bolstering [the] assertion that conditions in China have 
changed for the worse.”  Id. at 622. 
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when they learned she and her boyfriend were living together.  
The IJ found Zhu’s testimony lacked credibility, denied her 
application, and ordered her removed to China.  The BIA 
affirmed the IJ’s decision without an opinion.    
 
 In 2002, Zhu filed a timely motion to reopen, alleging 
that since the time of the IJ’s decision she had married and 
given birth to a son, and that she would be forcibly sterilized 
if she returned to China.  The BIA denied the motion, noting 
that Zhu only had one child, which was not in violation of 
Chinese population control policies, and that she had not 
shown that “a Chinese national becomes automatically 
subject to punitive birth control measures if she has returned 
with a child or children born outside China.”  Appendix 
(“App.”)2 1213.   
 
 In 2008, Zhu filed a second motion to reopen, alleging 
that she had given birth to two more children and that 
conditions had changed in China because the Chinese 
government now counted children born overseas when 
considering violations of its population control policies.  She 
submitted, among other things, a notice from the Family 
Planning Office of Lianjiang County to Zhu’s parents, 
indicating that Zhu must submit to sterilization upon her 
return to China, and a letter from her mother, noting that the 
officials had learned that Zhu had children.  The BIA denied 
the motion because Zhu’s documentation showed no material 
change in country conditions, but rather reflected 
“incremental increases in the enforcement of family planning 
policies in China that have been in existence for 
approximately 30 years.”  App. 1146.    
                                              
 2 All cites to the appendix are to volumes II and III. 
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 On January 14, 2013, Zhu filed a third motion to 
reopen, this time with voluminous documentation that she 
asserts demonstrates a “material change” in China’s 
enforcement of its population control policies in her home 
region.  See App. 11-1143.  These documents purportedly 
come from the U.S. government, Chinese government 
websites, Chinese governmental entities or officials, and 
international media outlets.  She contends that these 
documents show that the United States Department of State’s 
May 2007 “China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country 
Conditions” (the “2007 Profile”), which the BIA had 
previously relied upon concerning treatment of those who 
violate the population control policies, does not reflect current 
conditions in China.  Among other things, Zhu asserts that 
these documents show that foreign-born children now count 
for family planning purposes and new programs have been 
implemented in her home province that more strictly enforce 
population controls.  Zhu also provided an affidavit from an 
expert opining about the authenticity of four documents 
purporting to embody population control enforcement 
measures from Changle City, which is approximately thirty 
kilometers from Zhu’s hometown of Guantou.  On March 28, 
2013, the BIA denied Zhu’s motion to reopen, concluding 
that she had failed to establish a material change in country 
conditions and had not demonstrated a prima facie case for 
CAT relief.  Zhu thereafter filed a petition for review. 
 
II.  
 
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 to 
review Zhu’s motion to reopen, and we have jurisdiction to 
review the BIA’s decision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of 
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discretion.  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004)  
Thus, the BIA’s ultimate decision is entitled to “broad 
deference,” Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “will not 
be disturbed unless [it is] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.”  Guo, 386 F.3d at 562 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).3  Similarly, we review the BIA’s 
evidentiary rulings deferentially.  See Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 
623 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
III.  
  
 With limited exceptions, a motion to reopen must be 
filed within ninety days of the date of entry of a final 
administrative order.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  To obtain 
relief  based on an untimely motion to reopen, Zhu had to 
provide material evidence of changed conditions in China that 
could not have been discovered or presented during the 
previous proceeding.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Here, 
the BIA denied Zhu’s motion to reopen her removal 
proceedings because it found: (1) “[h]er evidence is not 
sufficient to establish a material change in circumstances or 
country conditions ‘arising in the country of nationality’ so as 
to create an exception to the time and number limitations for 
filing another late motion to reopen to apply for asylum,” and 
                                              
3 We review the BIA’s factual findings under the 
substantial evidence standard, which means that they are 
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–84 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
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(2) she “has not demonstrated a prima facie case for 
protection under [CAT].”4  App. 6.   
 
 To determine if the BIA abused its discretion in 
finding that Zhu did not present evidence to establish a 
material change in country conditions, we must determine if 
the BIA meaningfully considered the evidence and arguments 
Zhu presented.  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  This does not mean that the BIA is required to 
expressly parse each point or discuss each piece of evidence 
presented, id. at 268, but “it may not ignore evidence 
favorable to the alien.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 
388 (3d. Cir. 2010).  To fulfill this requirement, the BIA must 
provide an indication that it considered such evidence, and if 
the evidence is rejected, an explanation as to why it was 
rejected. 
 
In this case, Zhu presented more than 85 documents, 
spanning over 1,000 pages.   With little explanation, the BIA 
concluded that: (1) Zhu failed to authenticate documents from 
China; (2) documents from places other than Zhu’s 
hometown or county do not establish she is likely to be 
persecuted; (3) her expert’s opinion concerning the 
authenticity of four foreign documents was speculative; (4) 
evidence from components of the United States government 
did not show Zhu would be subjected to sterilization; and (5) 
she did not show that the 2007 Profile is now inaccurate or 
unreliable.  We will examine the BIA’s treatment of each 
category of evidence. 
                                              
 4 On appeal, Zhu does not challenge the BIA’s finding 
that she did not show prima facie eligibility for CAT relief.   
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A.   Foreign Government Documents 
 
1. Authentication Generally 
 
We first address the authentication of documents from 
foreign sources.  Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6,5 official 
foreign records must be “evidenced by an official 
publication” or “certified by an officer in the Foreign Service 
of the United States, stationed in the foreign country where 
the record is kept.”  Attempting to comply with this 
provision, Zhu’s attorney sent each Chinese government 
document to the Consulate General of the United States in 
Guangzhou, China, and the Fujian Provincial Foreign Affairs 
Office, asking for assistance in authenticating the documents, 
but he received no replies.     
 
  Although failure to authenticate pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1287.6 does not result in automatic exclusion, Liu v. 
Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 532 (3d Cir. 2004), an unsuccessful 
effort to obtain such a certification does not excuse the 
proponent of the document from providing other grounds on 
which the BIA could find that a document is what it purports 
to be.  Indeed, we have held that when an asylum seeker fails 
to comply with the certification procedure set forth in 8 
C.F.R. § 1287.6 because of a “lack of cooperation from 
government officials in the country of alleged persecution,” 
that individual may “attempt to prove the authenticity . . . 
                                              
 5 The language of this regulation is identical to 8 
C.F.R. § 287.6.  The only meaningful distinction is that 8 
C.F.R. § 287.6 applies to proceedings before an IJ, whereas 8 
C.F.R. § 1287.6 applies to proceedings before the BIA.   
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through other means.”6  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 686-
87 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Liu, 372 F.3d at 533).  Proponents of 
evidence have an obligation to lay a foundation from which a 
factfinder can conclude the evidence is what it purports to be 
and that it is trustworthy.  The BIA concluded that Zhu had 
not “established the authenticity of her foreign documents in 
another manner.”  App. 5.   Other than its analysis of the 
expert’s opinion concerning a handful of local documents,  
the decision treats most of the foreign documents Zhu 
submitted similarly, regardless of their alleged source, and 
does not address whether other efforts were made to 
authenticate the documents and, if so, why they failed.7   
 
 Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply 
to immigration proceedings, Ezeagwuna, 325 F.3d at 405, 
evidence is admissible if it is probative and its use is 
fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due 
process.  See, e.g., Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 
268 (2d Cir. 2006).  Exclusion of evidence is exceptional.  
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).  
Nonetheless, the BIA can reject evidence that it finds to be 
untrustworthy or irrelevant and can accept evidence that has 
significant indicia of reliability. 
                                              
 6 We have adopted this holding because “asylum 
applicants [cannot] always reasonably be expected to have an 
authenticated document from an alleged persecutor.” Liu, 372 
F.3d at 532. 
 7The BIA did consider Zhu’s proffered expert opinion 
as to the authenticity of four local government documents.  
But other than the expert opinion, the BIA’s opinion does not 
reflect consideration of other means by which Zhu’s foreign 
documents may be authenticated.   
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  These significant indicia of reliability may be shown 
in various ways.  For example, proponents could turn to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, even though they are not binding, 
for guidance.  Here, some of the documents Zhu presented 
appear to come from Chinese government websites (indicated 
by “.gov.cn” domain names).  App. 307-33.   The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, considering the same 
documents and relying on Fed. R. Evid. 902, held that 
documents from Chinese government websites are 
“presumptively authentic if government sponsorship can be 
verified by visiting the website itself.”  Chen v. Holder, 715 
F.3d 207, 212 (7th Cir. 2013).  This is one example of how 
the Federal Rules of Evidence may provide an avenue to 
authenticate documents.8   
 
 In addition, proponents may provide other grounds 
upon which the BIA could find the documents authentic.  For 
instance, the proponent could provide information concerning 
how the document was obtained, identify the source of the 
information contained in the document, or show that there are 
                                              
 8 The BIA itself has recognized that “[t]he [Rules], 
while not binding, may provide helpful guidance in 
immigration proceedings because the fact that specific 
evidence would be admissible under the Federal Rules ‘lends 
strong support to the conclusion that admission of the 
evidence comports with due process.’”  Matter of D-R-, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. 445, 458 n.9 (BIA 2011) (quoting Felzcerek v. 
INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Vatyan v. 
Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1182-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that foreign government records may be authenticated 
through 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 or any recognized procedure, 
including the Federal Rules of Evidence).   
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consistencies between the information contained in the 
otherwise unauthenticated document and authenticated 
documents.  A proponent could also offer an expert to testify 
about these topics and others, such as the use of government 
seals or the presence of official signatures with which the 
expert is familiar.  The proponent could also offer forensic 
testing results or evidence from the United States Department 
of State concerning foreign documents.  Cf. Liu, 372 F.3d at 
534-35 & n.9 (reminding the BIA that it may “choose to order 
forensic testing of the original [document] . . ., take additional 
testimony, [and] seek guidance from State Department 
reports”).  We emphasize that the burden to make this 
showing of authenticity as well as relevance rests with the 
proponent of the document.  The BIA is not required to 
conduct an independent examination of a document where the 
proponent has provided no basis from which it could find the 
document is authentic or decipher its relevance.  Thus, if a 
proponent fails to make such a showing, then it is within the 
BIA’s discretion to decline to rely on such evidence.  If such 
a showing is made, then the BIA must consider the evidence.  
See Zheng, 549 F.3d at 266.   
 
2.  Documents from Guantou Town and Lianjiang 
County 
 
Turning to Zhu’s evidence, we will first examine the 
BIA’s treatment of documents from Zhu’s hometown and 
county, which the BIA either ignored, rejected, or discounted.  
These documents purport to describe recent population 
campaigns to meet quotas for sterilizations and abortions.9  
                                              
 9 For example, Zhu submitted the following evidence 
that was unavailable at the time of her last motion to reopen: 
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed many 
of the same documents and noted that if the documents are 
genuine, “they constitute strong evidence that harrowing 
practices are common in” her hometown and county.  Ni, 715 
F.3d at 628.  The BIA did not specifically discuss these 
                                                                                                     
a post-September 1, 2008 document purportedly issued by the 
People’s Government of Guantou Town as family planning 
publicity material, titled “The Campaign of ‘Bringing the 
New Custom of Marriage and Child-bearing into Thousands 
of Households’ in Guantou Town,” which states that 
“[w]omen with one child are required to perform an IUD 
insertion; women with two or more children are required to 
perform the sterilization . . . [r]emedial measures should be 
taken for unauthorized pregnancies (such as abortion or 
induced labor abortion),” App. 729-30; a June 11, 2009 
document allegedly issued by the People’s Government of 
Guantou Town to every village, titled “Notification with 
regard to the Issues on Stepping Up the Work of the Hundred-
Day Battle on Population and Family Planning,” which 
instructs officials to “complete the missions of required 
abortion, induced labor abortion, sterilization, and collection 
of social maintenance fees,” App. 701; and a December 24, 
2010 document supposedly issued by the Lian Jiang County 
Population and Family Planning Leadership Group to various 
township family planning leadership groups, titled 
“Announcement on Launching Countywide Massive Family 
Planning Clean-Up Work,” which instructs them to form 
“task force[s]” to “enter into the homes” of people who 
“return to their hometown for the holidays” and conduct a 
“2011 New Year and Spring Festival massive cleanup 
campaign on ‘double check-ups,’ ‘four surgeries’ and social 
child support fee collections,” App. 687. 
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documents, so we do not know if it discounted them because 
they lacked authenticity or relevance, or for some other 
reason.  Thus, we are unable to evaluate whether the BIA 
appropriately exercised its discretion.   
 
Because the documents from Zhu’s hometown and 
county that she presented, if authentic, may be probative and 
other avenues may be available to authenticate them,  and 
because we are unable to discern why the BIA discounted 
them, we will remand to the BIA for it to consider whether 
Zhu has made a showing of authenticity and relevance 
concerning those documents.  If the BIA determines that such 
a showing has been made, then it may give whatever weight it 
deems appropriate to that evidence in light of all of the other 
evidence presented.  Liu, 372 F.3d at 534 n.9 (“[T]he BIA 
may proceed on remand as it does with respect to any 
evidentiary question, evaluating issues of materiality, 
relevance, probity, and the general requirements of due 
process.”).   
 
3.  Documents from Fujian Province 
 
We next examine the documents from neighboring 
areas within Zhu’s home province, Fujian.  Zhu offered 
documents that appear to come from Fujian’s government 
website and other province level sources,10 as well as internal 
                                              
 10 For example, Zhu submitted a print-out purportedly 
from a Fujian government website page dated May 6, 2008, 
titled “Answer to Robert Lin’s Inquiry: ‘Family Planning 
Policy with Respect to People Returning to China from 
Overseas,’” which gives an answer from Fujian’s Population 
and Procreation Planning Committee, stating that the 
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government documents from other towns and counties within 
Fujian,11 that purport to describe population control campaign 
                                                                                                     
sterilization policy applies to parents of two overseas-born 
children returning to Fujian.  App. 307-08.  
 11 For example, Zhu submitted the following evidence 
that was unavailable at the time of her last motion to reopen: 
a May 7, 2009 document allegedly issued by the Chang Le 
City Population and Family Planning Leadership Group, 
titled “Announcement on Diligently Implementing the 
Population and Family Planning Work in May, June and 
July,” which instructs officials to “[s]upervise the 
actualization of double check-ups, IUD installation, 
sterilization and social child support fee collections” and 
[s]peed up the sterilization process,” while explaining that 
“[a]ll illegal extra pregnancies should be inducted or 
terminated.” App. 401-03; a December 2, 2009 document 
purportedly issued by the Family Planning Leading Group of 
Tantou Town, titled “Notice of Strengthening of Family 
Planning Work of Tantou Town,” which, in accordance with 
“the spirit of ‘Population and Family Planning Regulations of 
Fujian Province,’” confirms that “Chinese women whom 
have given birth to two children in a foreign country . . . 
[r]egardless of whether their children have foreign nationality 
. . . are required to return to China and undergo sterilization 
operation . . . [u]nless they change their nationalities,” App. 
608; and a December 31, 2009  document supposedly issued 
by the Leading Team of Population and Family Planning of 
Chang Le City, titled “Notification with Regard to Serious 
Implementation of Population and Family Planning Program 
in October, November and December,” which instructs the 
leading teams of various townships to “organize village 
household cadres to prepare for an urgency effort on targets 
15 
 
details and policies.  The BIA found documents outside Zhu’s 
hometown and county inapplicable to Zhu, and hence 
irrelevant.  The BIA’s treatment of this evidence is 
inconsistent with its past decisions wherein it allowed a 
petitioner to establish eligibility for relief based upon 
evidence that the births of her children “violated family 
planning policies in that alien’s local province, municipality, 
or other locally-defined area.”  In re J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
196, 197-98 (BIA 2007); cf. Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 
142 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting the BIA acknowledges the local 
nature of family planning enforcement in China).  Moreover, 
the BIA inexplicably found the information in these 
documents to be of no value yet found information in U.S. 
country reports describing activities in areas outside of Zhu’s 
home region, as described below, worthy of consideration.  
Because the BIA did not explain why it did not consider 
Zhu’s evidence from other areas within her home province of 
Fujian—some of which are within 30 kilometers of her 
hometown—and which may corroborate her claim, we will 
remand for the BIA to consider whether the documents from 
Zhu’s province are authentic and relevant, and, if they are, 
why they do not warrant reopening the proceedings.12 
                                                                                                     
who have failed to carry out long-term contraceptive 
measures,” “strictly fulfill any proposed sterilization duty,” 
and “[s]trengthen critical remedial measures” by 
“implementation of induced labor operation.”  App. 852. 
 12 This directive is not tantamount to requiring that the 
BIA grant the motion to reopen.  Rather, it is a directive to 
explain if the proponent has shown that the documents are 
relevant and authentic and, if so, whether they support the 
motion to reopen. 
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We will, however, not disturb the decision to reject the 
expert opinion that Zhu offered to authenticate four 
documents purportedly from the Chang Le City Population 
and Family Planning Leadership Group, Chinese Communist 
Party Chang Le City Shou Zhan Township Committee, and 
the Shou Zhan Township Population and Family Planning 
Leadership Group.  Zhu’s expert, Dr. Flora Sapio,13 opined 
that the documents were authentic based on their language, 
style, format, and internal coherence.  She identified two of 
the documents as notices, and concluded, based on their 
bureaucratic language and the persons to whom they are 
addressed, that one is from an organ of the state and one is 
from the party committee of Shouzhan Township in Fujian 
Province.  She then explained that the other two documents 
are likely internal memoranda that administrative law 
enforcement officials used or possibly distributed to residents, 
given their simple language and terse tone.  The BIA 
discounted Dr. Sapio’s expert opinion because it found it 
“speculates as to the credibility of the authors and the 
circumstances under which the documents were created.”  
App. 6. 
 
As stated earlier, we review the BIA’s evidentiary 
ruling deferentially.  Cheng, 623 F.3d at 182.  Under this 
                                              
 13 Dr. Sapio received her doctorate in History and 
Civilization of the Far East, and describes herself as a 
Chinese law scholar.  She has published articles about 
corruption and economic crimes in China.  She explained 
that, as part of her research on “legal lawlessness,” App. 468, 
she examines Chinese legal and political documents, and the 
first operation she normally performs on any document 
source is assessing whether or not it is genuine.   
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deferential standard, we cannot say that the BIA abused its 
discretion in discounting the expert’s opinion.  Other than 
saying that she received the documents from Zhu’s counsel, 
Dr. Sapio does not provide any information concerning how 
or from whom the documents were obtained.  Moreover, 
while Dr. Sapio explained why the presence or absence of 
serial numbers, the paper size, headings, interlinear spaces, 
margins, main body of text, official seals, filing information, 
and classification level suggest that they are authentic 
documents from government entities, she provided no 
statements that show she is familiar with official seals or 
serial numbers used by the purported sources of these 
documents such that a factfinder could determine that the 
document comes from the entity associated with the seal.  
Thus, the BIA had no information upon which to determine 
the source of these four documents other than the linguistic 
analysis on which Dr. Sapio asked the BIA to rely.  Unlike 
other evidence it inexplicably discounted, the BIA explained 
why it rejected reliance on the expert’s opinion.  This 
explanation showed that the BIA considered the documents 
and the opinion and found that it lacked a basis on which to 
conclude that the documents came from the entities listed on 
them.  For these reasons, we will not disturb the BIA’s 
decision not to rely upon Dr. Sapio’s expert opinion.14 
 
 B.  U.S. Government Documents 
  
                                              
14 As the Seventh Circuit noted, the BIA’s rejection of 
Dr. Sapio’s expert opinion has been discussed in at least 
nineteen appellate cases from six circuits, and not once has a 
court of appeals found the BIA’s rejection of the expert report 
to constitute an abuse of discretion.  See Ni, 715 F.3d at 625. 
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 Finally, we examine the BIA’s treatment of documents 
from components of the U.S. government.  In this case, there 
is no indication that the BIA misunderstood its authority to 
consider such documents, but it appears it did not give full 
consideration to their contents.  The BIA found that the 2009 
and 2010 Annual Reports of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China (“CECC”),15 the 2007 Profile, and 
State Department reports from 1994, 1995, 1998, 2004, and 
200516 indicated that “social compensation fees, job loss or 
demotion, loss of promotion opportunity, expulsion from the 
party, destruction of property, and other administrative 
punishments are used to enforce [China’s] family planning 
policy.”  App. 5.  The BIA then concluded that this evidence 
“is not sufficient to demonstrate that the respondent will be 
                                              
 15 The CECC is a body created by Congress with the 
legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the 
development of the rule of law in China.  It is composed of 
nine Senators, nine Members of the House of 
Representatives, and five senior Administration officials 
appointed by the President.  See http://www.cecc.gov/about.  
The CECC reports “are pertinent official publications of the 
federal government.”  Chen, 715 F.3d at 209. 
16 These other State Department reports are titled: 
“China – Country Conditions and Comments on Asylum 
Application,” dated December 20, 1994, App. 1125-44; 
“China – Country Conditions and Comments on Asylum 
Application,” dated December 11, 1995, App. 1051-74; 
“China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions,” 
dated April 14, 1998, App. 1076-89; “China: Profile of 
Asylum Claims and Country Conditions,” dated June 2004, 
App. 1091-99; and “China: Profile of Asylum Claims and 
Country Conditions,” dated October 2005, App. 1101-10. 
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subjected to sterilization.”  Id.17  While the BIA recited a 
number of social and economic actions that China takes to 
enforce its population control policies, it seemingly ignored 
statements in the 2009 and 2010 CECC Reports concerning 
“forced abortions” and “coerced abortions and 
sterilizations.”18  App. 111, 140, 142-43.  Like our sister 
circuit, who criticized an identical BIA conclusion19 about 
enforcement methods, we too question “[w]hy the BIA found 
the [CECC] Reports’ discussion of certain ‘administrative 
punishments’ and coercive tactics to be persuasive, but 
                                              
 17The BIA also held that Zhu had failed to show that 
she would face economic harm amounting to persecution 
because she had not offered information to establish her 
current financial situation.  App. 6 (citing to In re T-Z-, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. 163 (BIA 2007) (no showing of economic 
sanctions amounting to persecution where the record contains 
scant information concerning the applicant’s financial 
situation)).  On appeal, Zhu does reference the fines she 
would face if forced to return to China, but she does not 
challenge the BIA’s ruling that failure to provide evidence of 
her financial situation dooms that argument. 
18Also curious is the BIA’s reliance on evidence of the 
enforcement methods described in the documents from 1994 
to 2004, particularly where the BIA is only allowed to grant a 
motion to reopen if presented with new or previously 
unavailable evidence.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).     
 19 The BIA in Ni also ignored the portions of the 
CECC reports that described abortion and sterilization 
activities and used language identical to the language the BIA 
used in Zhu’s case in reaching its conclusions about what 
could be drawn from these documents.  Compare Ni, 715 
F.3d at 627 with App. 5.  
20 
 
[apparently] found the Reports’ discussion of forced 
sterilizations and abortions in Fujian Province not to be 
persuasive . . . .”  Ni, 715 F.3d at 627.  Moreover, the BIA’s 
treatment of these reports is inconsistent with its precedent 
that requires a comparison of current country conditions with 
those that existed at the time of the hearing on the merits of 
the petition before the IJ.  See In re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
247, 253 (BIA 2007).  Because these reports materially bear 
on Zhu’s claim and it appears that the BIA only considered 
parts of them, and in light of the BIA’s duty to consider 
material evidence and explain why it does or does not support 
the position of a party,20 Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268, we will 
remand to the BIA for its full consideration of these reports.21   
                                              
 20 We do note that, despite Zhu’s arguments to the 
contrary, the BIA did not err in continuing to place great 
weight on the 2007 Profile.  See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 
388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that “State 
Department reports may constitute ‘substantial evidence’ for 
the purposes of reviewing immigration decisions”); Lal v. 
INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing State 
Department country reports as the “most appropriate and 
perhaps best resource” on country conditions (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  The BIA explained that the 
evidence Zhu presented did not “support [Zhu’s] claim that 
the 2007 Profile is heavily reliant upon information provided 
by the Chinese government,” because it found that “State 
Department reports . . . cite multiple sources of information.”  
App. 5.  That said, on remand, the BIA should provide an 
explanation for rejecting Zhu’s assertion that more recent 
CECC reports show an increase in the use of “coercive 
measures” to enforce the population control policies and thus, 
from her perspective, suggest that the 2007 Profile is out-of-
21 
 
 In short, like the Seventh Circuit, we conclude that the 
BIA’s treatment of the U.S. Government and foreign 
government evidence was “perfunctory,” Ni, 715 F.3d at 627, 
and, as a result, the BIA failed to “announce its decision in 
terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it 
has heard and thought and not merely reacted.”  Id. at 631 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Chen 
v. Holder, --- F.3d ---, No. 12-2279, 2014 WL 448444, at *7 
(4th Cir. Feb. 5, 2014) (remanding because the IJ and BIA 
failed to reconcile or explain why the 2009 CECC Report is 
“less persuasive” than the 2007 Profile); Zheng, 549 F.3d at 
266 (holding that “the BIA must actually consider the 
evidence and argument that a party presents” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Guo v. Gonzales, 463 
F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the BIA has “a 
duty to explicitly consider any country conditions evidence 
submitted by an applicant that materially bears on his claim,” 
and a “similar, if not greater, duty arises in the context of 
motions to reopen based on changed country conditions” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Yang v. 
Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005) (“If an agency 
makes a finding of fact without mentioning or analyzing 
significant evidence, its decision should be reconsidered.”  
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
 
                                                                                                     
date.  If the BIA is providing greater weight to State 
Department reports over reports from other United States 
government entities, then it should explain why it is doing so.   
 21 This is not to suggest that the CECC reports alone 
are necessarily sufficient to demonstrate a material change in 
country conditions.  Ni, 715 F.3d at 627. 
22 
 
IV.  
 
Because the BIA did not meaningfully address many 
of the documents Zhu presented, we will remand to the BIA 
for a more thorough review and explanation as to whether 
Zhu’s evidence is authentic and, if so, whether it establishes a 
material change in country conditions.  We are not suggesting 
that the evidence is authentic or sufficient.  Rather, we will 
remand for the BIA to meaningfully review the evidence, 
which may yield a different result or a further explanation for 
the BIA’s decision.22   
 
For all of these reasons, we will grant the petition for 
review, vacate the order denying the motion to reopen, and 
remand the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
                                              
 22 As a result, we will not address the BIA’s 
conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish a 
material change in country conditions. 
